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The root cause of flood disasters
By Naseer Memon
Heavy rains in Balochistan at the
end of June not only brought disaster to this province but certain
districts of Sindh on its eastern border also received devastating
flash floods.
Torrents from Balochistan entered
Sindh through Khirthar hills and inundated vast areas in districts
of Dadu and Shahdad Kot/Qambar. Thousands lost abodes and were
marooned in deep ponds of water for several days.
Unprecedented gushing flood from
Mula and Bolan rivers badly shattered the flood protection network
and the MNV/RBOD network breached at several places bringing havoc
to local communities. The floods once again exposed vulnerability
of the drainage project executed by Wapda on the Right Bank of
Indus.
A review of the disaster reveals
that it was not a natural calamity but bad engineering and poor
flood-management strategies wen e also responsible for it. The
Irrigation: Department made best possible efforts but its handling
of the situation was not up to the mark. . Knowing the climatic
and topographic features of the area and the history of high
floods, infrastructure building in the area required a more
cautious approach.
Torrential floods in Sindh: Sindh
province has two sources of flood. Riverine flood is more
predictable and allows ample time to react whereas torrential
floods leave almost no time to respond. Torrential floods have
lesser frequency and duration but very high intensity and hence
their impact is also severe. These floods normally occur in months
of July and August when its catchment areas in Balochistan receive
heavy rains. Western boundary of Sindh is connected with
Balochistan through Khirthar hills.
A series of ferocious torrents
including Mula, Boolan, Khanji, Mazarani, Dillan, Buri, Salari,
Shole, Gaaj, Angai, Naing and Bandani bring gushing waters from
high altitudes of Khirthar to ’kachhi’ plains of Sindh. This flood
requires entirely different management systems, institutional
capacities and infrastructure. High floods of 1942, 1944, 1948,
1956, 1973, 1975, 1976 and 1995 are reminders of this fact. The
floods of 1976 and 1995 were huge in magnitude and caused greater
devastation to the flood protection infrastructure and local
communities.
Protection system: Before the
construction of Sukkur barrage, its command area on the right bank
had natural drainage channels to carry torrential floods into
Indus River. A part of flow would drain through Main Nara Valley
Drain (an old river bed) and would feed into the fascinating echo
system of once Asia’s largest natural fresh water pond, Manchar
Lake. In 1932, when the barrage was constructed, a 70 mile-long
MNVD was shaped to car, a discharge of 2235 cusecs.
The MNVD banks also acted as flood
protection barrier separating irrigated right bank areas of Sukkur
command from hill torrents flood plain. The MNVD was later
converted into RBOD by Wapda to drain effluent from four
districts, which devastated Manchar Lake. At one stage Wapda was
to connect RBOD with Indus River but it retreated after a lot of
hue and cry by the civil society groups.
Flood protection work in the flood
areas is much more vulnerable than the riverine flood protection
work. In 1935, Flood Protection Bund (FP Bund) was constructed
along the natural contours to facilitate North-South diversion of
torrential flows towards Manchar Lake. The objective of this
172-mile long bund was to protect irrigated areas from flash
floods and safe diversion of flood to natural pond at Manchar.
According to the Indus River
Commission, flood protection bund has to be provided with a six
feet ’free board’ above the recorded highest flood. In 1995, flood
water overtopped the FP Bund at several locations and it was
breached at more than 30 locations. However the restoration work
just rehabilitated it to the pre-flood level and did not maintain
the new free board of six feet above the 1995 flood level. Also
its remodeling was completed to only 120 RDs d the remaining part
of 100 RDs was not remodeled, which faced the recent flood impact.
This fact was indicated in the Flood Fighting Plan for 2007
prepared by the Sindh Irrigation Department.
A Flood Diversion Bund has been
provided to divert gushing flows of Gaaj Nai in Dadu district. The
6.4 miles long bund also protects FP Bund from the direct stroke
of Gaj Nai. In super flood of 1995, this structure was badly
damaged. This bund was later remodeled to preflood condition.
However, no additional strengthening was provided if similar flood
was to strike again. Luckily this year Gaaj did not bring its
usual flow and the bund survived any major damage.
This year the flood came from the
north-western boundary with Balochistan and hit the districts of
Shahdad Kot/Qambar and later on Larkana and Dadu district. Mula
and Boolan rivers brought the major flows, which breached FP Bind
at RD 179,180,184 and 230. It set off a series of breaches and
cuts and 34 breaches and cutes were recorded in MNV Drain. These
breaches inundated several small and large villages and threatened
Qambar and Shahdad Kot towns also.
A technical assessment is required
to establish the role of the infrastructure and the management
system responsible for this havoc. An assessment based on site
visits, meetings with local communities, irrigation experts and
civil society groups brought the following facts to light:
·
Effective
early warning system is the key to manage flood disasters. Since
torrential floods allow very limited time to respond,
effectiveness of this system becomes even more important. There
exists no flood warning system between Balochistan and Sindh
provinces. Since Khairthar mountains receive flood from
Balochistan, there should be a mechanism by which Balochistan can
inform the Sindh government well on time to take necessary
precautions.
·
Sindh
Irrigation Department has only one gauge station at the mouth of
Gaaj Nai in Dadu district. Flash flood from this point hardly
takes 12 hours to reach mainstream areas. Even if the earliest
warning is received, this duration is insufficient to manage any
catastrophe in making. The modern weather forecast systems based
on satellite information sources has made it possible to develop a
fairly reliable flood warning system. It will definitely cost much
less than what the government normally spends on repair of damaged
infrastructure and relief and rehabilitation of devastated
communities.
·
Environmental, economic and social cost of losses will further
justify this much deserving investment. This can be gauged from
the fact that after 1995 flood damages, strengthening of Gaj
Diversion Bund at Gaj Nai and FP Bund cost about Rs700 million to
public exchequer. Effective flood warning system will also help
timely evacuation of vulnerable areas identified through careful
mapping.
·
Infrastructure development in the flood plains is not being
Tdesigned with prior understanding of natural flood routes.
Irrigation experts believe that the road network in the area also
obstructed the free flow of flood. Some local roads and Rato Dero-Khuzdar
Motorway are aligned against the flood flows and have inadequate
cross drainage provision, causing bouncing of flood water.
·
There is
no mechanism whereby National Highway Authority or Provincial
Highway Department seeks Irrigation Department’s advice on the
road alignment in the ’kachhi’ flood plain. This lack of
institutional networking is likely to cause more damage in future.
·
Wapda’s
experiment of converting fresh water MNVD into a saline water
channel of RBOD resulted in disaster for
Manchar Lake. Now Wapda is
undertaking several drainage schemes in upper reaches through RBOD-III
for canalising effluent from Balochistan’s irrigated areas and
drain it to the main RBOD drain.
·
A complex
drainage network for Usta Mohammad areas is under construction and
the EBOD is being connected to Hairdin drain and Chukhi through
new drains under RBOD-III to be connected with main RBOD network.
·
However
Wapda does not bother to involve Irrigation Department at local
level to assess the potential threats which may stem through this
drainage projects. According to officials of the Irrigation
Department, such co-ordination is non-existent and if any
consultation takes place, it is restricted to higher offices which
have little understanding of ground realities.
·
Since
Wapda executes federal government’s projects, it hardly gives any
ear to the local irrigation departments, civil society groups and
communities. Failure of LBOD should have been enough lesson to
learn from but it does not seem happening. Local Irrigation
experts believe that the designed capacity of RBOD-III is also
insufficient to carry normal flows of the local drains let alone
heavy storm water.
·
In recent
flood Miro Khan and Shahda Kot drains experienced backflow since
MNV was facing high flood. This could have inundated Shahdad Kot
and Miro Khan towns. Likewise if Indus River receives heavy flood
(above 700,000 cusecs), chances are high that it may choke RBOD-II
at Bago Toro hills near Sehwan, which flows very dose to Indus
River.
·
There is a
need to address the misuse of water in head reaches of rice
cultivation areas to reduce the quantity of drainage effluent.
Irrigation system designed in British period did not require
drainage because it was based on judicious supply in head and tail
reaches; violation of which has created the problem. Addressing
the root cause is more prudent rather than addressing effects,
which Wapda is practicing since years.
·
Flood
Control Plan for Sindh province was developed in 1978 and has not
been revised since then. Whole landscape has undergone several
changes over the years and living with three decades old flood
management system indicates the prevalence of institutional
bankruptcy. This needs to be revised based on the experiences of
last 30 years and the new ground realities. Bund manual was also
developed in 1978 and merits revision.
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