Devolution with Accountability: Learning from Good Practices
By G. Shabbir Cheema 

The devolution of powers and resources to local governments is essential to promote sustainable decentralization in developing countries. Local governments with decision making powers and ability to raise resources through their own mechanisms are able to play a catalytic role in the development process. Furthermore, citizens are more likely to actively participate in the local political process where local government is perceived to be sufficiently autonomous in making political decisions affecting them. This improves the quality of local democratic process.

One of the challenges in promoting devolution in developing countries, however, is that frequently the local elite capture services and facilities provided through local governments or field offices of central government. Also corruption and misuse of authority are sometimes more rampant at the local than at the national level. These problems are more serious in societies that are characterized by highly inequitable social and economic structures and high incidence of poverty and illiteracy. Even the strongest advocates of decentralization argue, therefore, that effective devolution requires corresponding mechanisms to ensure accountability of local actors-politicians, government officials, representatives of civil society, and others involved in allocating resources and influencing local political decisions.

This chapter examines the relationship between decentralization and democratic governance, devolution as an essential ingredient of decentralization, and the significance of accountability and ant-corruption strategies at the local level to promote the legitimacy and effectiveness of devolution. The chapter then identifies and discusses six mechanisms and instruments to enhance the accountability and transparency of local governments. 

Decentralization and Democratic Governance

Democratic governance is characterized by such fundamental principals as participation, transparency, accountability, access, subsidiarity, representation, separation of powers, and an independent judiciary. Decentralization is conducive to achievement of these principles.’ It provides an institutional framework at the subnational, local, and community levels through which groups and citizens can organize themselves and participate in political and economic decisions affecting them. Decentralization thus provides avenues and opportunities for representation by political, religious, and ethnic groups and the participation of the opposition groups in the political process (in the case of South Africa and Uganda, the latter has promoted national unity).

Democratic governance is thus achieved through a decentralization policy that

·  Promotes accountability and transparency of central government officials. Because of their day-to-day interaction with local political leaders, central government officials are more likely to be held accountable for their actions than in situations where decisions are made by the central government-in many cases far away from local areas. Decentralization also improves closer monitoring by the beneficiary population of projects intended to serve them.

·  Promotes the institutionalization of democratic culture by providing opportunities to groups and individuals to make political and financial decisions affecting their jurisdiction, by ongoing dialogue among local actors, and by utilizing the knowledge and expertise of communities. This creates an environment of local ownership of programs and projects.

·  Helps create checks and balances among the center, the subnational level, and the local level (one of the key ingredients of democratic governance). Decentralization thus promotes a political environment of accommodation and negotiation.

·  Facilitates the growth of civil society organizations and networks by providing for the establishment of civil society organizations to address local issues that impact directly on the lives of the people.

Decentralization to municipalities and towns is especially important for two reasons. First, the urban population of the world has expanded from 30 percent in 1950 to 47 percent to 2000 and is projected to increase to 60 percent by 2030. Second, cities and towns are the principal drivers of social and economic development and technological transformation. Cities mean an increase in productivity and improved quality of goods and services; they are also centers of ideas, innovations, and learning. Decentralization allows the emergence of an “inclusive city,” or one that facilitates full utilization of energies and resources of all groups in the community, including civil society organizations.

Decentralization is not a panacea, however, for developing democratic governance. Many dangers and pitfalls associated with decentralization can impede the design and implementation of elements of liberal democracy. In some cases, authoritarian local leaders get elected and rule undemocratically. In countries such as Colombia, members of opposition parties are subjected to violence. In some democracies with a federal system of government, such as Brazil, there are serious tensions between human rights agendas and the policies of the federal and state-and even local-governments. For example, political decentralization in Estonia and Latvia led to the exclusion of Russians-almost 40 percent of the population in Estonia-through language and citizenships laws. Other dangers of decentralization are that it can increase geographic inequalities due to the different resource bases of sub-national units; it may lead to redundancy and inefficiency because of the lack of clear delineation of authority and responsibilities; and it may lead to more divisions among the society based on ethnicity. 

Devolution to the Local Level

Decentralization is a broad concept. As a means, it can improve efficiency and effectiveness of public services. As an end in itself, it can promote the basic principles of democratic governance. It can take one or more of four forms:

·  Deconcentration of responsibilities from central government ministries and departments to sub-national and local levels

·  Delegation of powers to semiautonomous bodies to perform specific tasks

·  Devolution of powers and resources to local governments

·  Transfer of responsibilities to nongovernmental organizations.

In practice, all countries have a combination of these forms, ranging from a focus on deconcentration and delegation with limited devolution to much more focus on devolution of political, financial, and administrative authority to directly elected local governments. To varying degrees, each form of decentralization contributes to democratic governance. Deconcentration in these forms brings government officials-and administrative decision making-closer to the people, giving citizens opportunities to monitor government programs. Delegation, though it brings decision making about specific activities closer to the people who are affected, does not provide direct channels for local political control as in the case of devolution.

Decentralization through transfer to nongovernmental organizations often involves contracting out partial service provision, administration functions, and deregulation or full privatization. Public functions could be transferred to trade associations, professional organizations, farmers’ cooperatives, and women and youth associations. This form of decentralization also positively affects the promotion of democratic processes because it allows decisions to be made through processes that involve large number of political interests.

While each of the above forms of decentralization indirectly contributes to achieving the goals of democratic governance, devolution of powers and resources to elected local governments is the key ingredient of democracy and good governance. Devolution is aimed at creating or strengthening independent units of government by devolving functions and authority. Its fundamental characteristics are the autonomous nature of local units of government, legally recognized geographical boundaries within which they exercise their authority, and the power of local governments to mobilize resources to perform their tasks. This form of decentralization also implies that local governments are seen as institutions that provide services to local citizens who have control over their functioning. Local governments are one level of the national political system, each with mutually beneficial and legally recognized roles and responsibilities.

The global trends toward devolution of political and financial authority are visible in many recent country-level decentralization initiatives. In India, with two amendments to the constitution in 1992 including reservation of one-third of the seats for women, local governments have been strengthened. In 1999 about 238,000 local councils were elected across the country.

In Ghana the restructuring of local governments has provided more authority and resources to local governments. Within the guidelines provided by the National Development Planning Commission, districts have considerable autonomy to decide on their own development needs and priorities and have more control over resources. They can raise some of their own resources and can negotiate directly with donors for district-level projects. In addition, 5 percent of the national budget is allocated to districts specifically for development purposes.

Yemen’s experience with decentralized governance dates back to its local development associations of the late 1960s. These groups were able to mobilize most of their resources from local communities to build schools and local health clinics. Regional development initiatives, piloted in five governorates, emphasize community self-reliance and microcredit and technical assistance. The number of civil society organizations in Yemen has been growing rapidly.

Uganda has one of the most comprehensive decentralization programs in Africa. The constitution adopted in 1995 calls for the devolution of power to local governments. The Local Government Act of 1997 grants local councils the powers to raise revenues and initiate their own development programs. Local councilors were elected in 1998.

South Africa’s local councils elected in 1995 are an example of a genuine attempt at empowerment. These councils were aimed at extending democratic processes to local areas and creating institutional mechanisms for the delivery of goods and services.

The Local Government Plan 2000 introduced by the military-led government of Pakistan is one of the most comprehensive local government reforms in the country’s history in terms of local government control over local resources and financial autonomy, district and sub-district planning systems, and local level information and monitoring systems. The Local Government Plan integrates rural and urban local governments as well as government departments at the local level into one coherent structure, in which district administration and police are accountable to elected chief executive of the district.

There are many constraints on the devolution of financial and political authority to local governments. Both supporters and opponents of devolution agree that, without adequate mechanisms for accountability and for combating corruption at the local level, devolution could lead to inefficiencies, misuse of resources, and loss of citizens’ trust in the local political process. 

Accountability and Anticorruption at the Local Level

Accountability of elected local governments and effective anticorruption strategies at the local level are essential to promote and sustain political and economic devolution. These can serve as strategic entry points for improving the effectiveness of local governance through devolution. Effective financial, political, and administrative accountability mechanisms at the local government level compel local officials to focus on results, seek clear objectives, develop effective strategies, and monitor and report on performance. Lack of accountability leads to corruption, which negatively affects the legitimacy of local governments. Frequently, central government officials who are opposed to devolution point to corruption at the local level as an excuse to delay and sometimes sabotage transfer of powers and resources.

Even though in theory corrupt local politicians can be voted out of power in a democratically elected local government, in practice local political leaders in feudal societies and in societies with great economic disparities hold a monopoly on local political power. In countries where political corruption is pervasive, local elections are characterized by electoral fraud and voter intimidation. The need to make elections free and fair has been on the national agenda of many countries, but corrupt influences on the outcome of elections have become widespread. In many developing countries, local elections are marked by violence, massive fraud, vote buying, and electioneering under government auspices. In Pakistan, for example, the opposition raised questions about the fairness of local elections. In Bangladesh successive elections have led to serious disputes between the ruling and opposition parties about the outcome, leading to a constitutional amendment that provides for an interim government three months before a national election is held to ensure that the ruling party does not misuse its power during the election.

Furthermore, elections in developing countries-including those at the local level-have become expensive. Because money invested in elections has to be paid back, and because most candidates use their own funds, the incentives for corruption can be seen in two scenarios, that of being elected and that of staying in power. As the case of the Philippines shows, rising election campaign expenses result from massive spending on media, advertisements, transport, public relations, and a semisecret kitty to buy votes. Elections therefore have been increasingly understood in terms of the spoils system, which in practice opens the way for elected representatives to tap into public money, in many cases without safeguards against the abuse.

In the absence off organized and disciplined political parties, local elected councils in developing countries tend to be weak and unable to use their constitutionally guaranteed powers. The executive branch of local government, with the support of civil servants, monopolizes power. In the absence of an adequate system of checks and balances, disincentives for the diversion of public funds are not enforced. Political parties tend to become personal clubs through which politicians gain power rather than arenas for debate on local policies and programs. A common trend among citizens is to join the winning party after the election in the hope of gaining favor.

Political corruption can be entrenched in the democratic systems of both developing and developed countries. When campaign finance rules are not enforced and the judiciary is too weak to hold corrupt politicians accountable, politically well-connected middlemen collect bribes in return for misuse of political patronage by those in power; some serve as specialized party “cashiers” to collect money from sources, such as the construction industry, for the party coffers.

The reasons behind corruption at the local government level are almost identical to those at the national level: to obtain goods and services from the government below market price, to persuade officials to undertake certain tasks, to avoid the costs of government regulations and taxes, and to obtain contracts and concessions from the local government.

A 2004 United Nations study emphasizes the need to promote accountability and transparency in local governance and identifies four strategies to promote transparency and accountability in local governance: monitoring of transparency; access to information and public participation; promotion of ethics, professionalism, and integrity; and institutional reform. Over the past few decades sub-national governments, cities and towns, and other local governments have tried various instruments of accountability and transparency to promote and sustain devolution and to strengthen trust between citizens and local governments. These include

·  Local leadership commitment to accountability and transparency

·  Effective anticorruption bodies

·  Transparent and accountable systems of public procurement

·  Participatory budgeting and auditing

·  Engagement of civil society in local decision making

·  Promotion of ethics and integrity among local public officials

Local Leadership

The commitment of local leaders to local accountability and anticorruption strategies is essential for preventive measures, enforcement of existing regulations, public education and awareness, and institution building. Experience suggests that similar local institutional structures and designs produce different outcomes due largely to the quality of local leadership. The promotion of accountability and combating corruption at the local level is a long-term and ongoing process in which various groups try to protect their own interests.

Leadership needs to commit to the reform agenda and to a consistent pursuit of the agenda even in the face of short-term setbacks. Effective local government leaders forge partnerships among diverse groups, mediate differences, consult with various interest groups, and are committed to social justice. Trisectoral partnerships (between governments, the private sector, and civil society) have also become increasingly vital to improve basic service delivery. There are many good-practices models of leadership that promote accountability and anticorruption strategies.

In La Paz, Bolivia, Maclean-Abaroa, the first elected mayor in almost forty years, was sworn in on September 1985. He simplified the procedure for applying for construction permits and published these procedures to make people aware of the legal requirements. The Urban Development Department’s monopoly on construction permits was thus broken. The city government worked with the professional association of architects to certify members of the association to grant construction permits on behalf of the city government, provided that the requests met set regulations. Architects’ fees were determined by competition in the market.

The city government undertook random checks to ensure compliance with construction regulations. To avoid extortion on the part of the investigating committee, the architects’ association had the right to advocate on their behalf in case of baseless allegations. Other simplifications reduced the number of taxes from 126 to 6 and procurement steps from 26 to 7. The anticorruption process paid off in terms of increased government revenues and a tenfold increase in public works investment. Mayor Maclean-Abaroa was reelected for his fourth term.

In the municipality of Jinja, Uganda, the Markets Act of 1964 delegated authority and control over the central market to the district administration and to either municipal or town councils, depending on the location of the market. Market administrators were responsible, inter alia, for regulating the use of the market and its buildings; for keeping order, issuing permits, and collecting auction fees and stalls’ rents; and for making decisions as to the type of goods to sold. Because market administration had been suffering from red tape, corruption, and inefficiency, it was privatized. Through a comanagement system, a private contractor collected dues and maintained the market according to government rules. The role of the municipality was only that of setting numbers of licenses, setting license fees and rents, and setting standards for overall supervision. A vendors association was established to defend the interests of vendors and traders.

Surveys provided positive feedback about improvement in market management and service delivery as a result of privatization and the devolution of the administrative system; in addition, 74 percent of respondents expressed more willingness to pay their dues as compared to the past. After privatization, market revenues to the municipality increased by 27 percent. The municipality and district boards guarantee transparency through a tendering system managed by a “tender board” composed of council members and the community. A chairman of the board is elected. Tenders are advertised in the newspapers as well as the notice boards of district and municipal councils in both local and English languages.

Curitiba, the capital of Parana state in South Eastern Brazil, became an international reference for integrated and holistic planning, being recognized by the international media, experts, and development institutions as an example of how local elected officials can mobilize stakeholders and communities to tackle development challenges and create an environment of accountability and transparency of local governance.

The most critical factor was the leadership of Jaime Lerner, who as mayor introduced reforms. Mayor Lerner had to balance immediate physical expansion challenges and the growth of slum areas with the tremendous pressure for public transport, water, sanitation, and other basic services. He initiated institutional reform, including the creation of the Curitiba Research and Urban Planning Institute, the Curitiba Industrial City, and a plan for the revitalization of the historic center. During his subsequent terms of office, Mayor Lerner focused on environmental preservation, waste management programs, social services (including a network of day care centers), consolidation of the public transport system, and creation of the rapid transit system.

Various segments of society were engaged in the approval of a master plan for Curitiba, which was a blueprint for urban development based on consensus among the various communities. The plan was shared with the population and widely disseminated. It defined medium- and long-term development by outlining a growth structure based on public transport facilities going from the city center to the periphery, where the poor live; land use legislation; and the hierarchy of the road system. The plan also addressed the need to promote social services while sustaining economic growth. Dissemination of the plan helped to avoid land speculation and, by defining “equations of co-responsibility” through partnerships, helped engage various groups representing civil society and the private sector.

Mayor Lerner is widely known in Brazil and worldwide as an example of credibility and competence. The population saw results and saw the mayor leading by example. The mayor was never accused of any type of malfeasance and did not use his power to make exceptions to the rules defined to guide the development of Curitiba. The population never saw any signs of “unexplained wealth” on the part of the mayor, who has always lived in the same house and kept the same standard of living throughout his terms of office as the mayor. The mayor gained the trust of financial institutions, based on the seriousness of his administration. Banks underwrote public transport-private sector operations, and big companies such as Volvo, Bosch, and Siemens trusted the municipal administration enough to move to the Curitiba Industrial City. 

Anticorruption Commissions

Over the past few years, central and local governments have established anticorruption bodies to serve as watchdogs for local governments and to combat corruption through enforcement of existing regulations, punishment of violators, and raising the awareness of citizens. Various models of institutional reform have emerged and from various entities-some from the executive branch, some from offices outside the executive branch, and some from state and local governments. The key characteristics of effective anticorruption bodies are financial independence, administrative autonomy, a wide scope for action, linkages with political leaders and government ministries and departments, and internal capacity to perform their assigned tasks.

Though there are different approaches to designing anticorruption bodies, a 2004 United Nations study shows that the key determinants of their effectiveness are independent and nonpartisan commissioners, strong educational and training units in the commissions, a proactive community outreach program, and representation of a variety of communities among the commissioners and staff. Other elements of effective anticorruption commissions are adequacy of resources and staff and legal advisory units.

Devolution of financial and political authority to local governments leads to the performance by local governments of many complex functions, such as land allocation, business licensing, and recruitment and promotion of staff. The need therefore is to have clear administrative procedures that are impartially enforced. Institutional reform at the local government level that promotes accountability and transparency and effective anticorruption strategies takes many forms. One of the most important is the creation of independent anticorruption agencies. Others are the establishment of a complaints and ombudsman office, a one-stop shop, oversight committees, an independent audit function, and participatory budgeting.

Hong Kong established an Independent Commission against Corruption in 1974 to deal with corruption. It follows a multidimensional approach that includes prevention, education, and enlistment of support. As a preventive measure, the commission organized corruption prevention studies for public bodies and private sector companies. Also, to educate the public, it conducted mass media and public education campaigns against corruption. To enforce its strategy, the commission recruited investigators from the police, civil servants, engineers, accountants, and media experts to undertake investigations regarding enforcement of laws pertinent to corruption. The commission increased its enforcement efforts in the private sector, resulting in the prosecution of high profile figures of the business community, including the chairman of the stock exchange. The efforts of the commission have led to enhanced public trust in public services and the business sector.

In Ecuador municipalities are responsible for public services such as water, garbage collection, sewage disposal, and road construction. They also have authority over taxation and legal codes. Pedro Moncayo is one of the 219 municipalities of Ecuador. In this municipality and another three, the United Nations Development Program and the Civic Counter Corruption Commission implemented a transparency pilot project through participatory budgeting. The project designed transparency tools to improve service delivery and public oversight and opened the way for citizens to participate in public oversight of planning, budgeting, spending, and service delivery. Workshops helped citizens diagnose and identify risk areas in the municipal finance process and a way to take action in risk areas. The workshops covered participatory budgeting and accounts oversight, participatory public audits, and opening access to information to enhance municipality transparency. The municipalities were provided with manuals: “Transparent Municipal Management” and “Transparent Fiscal Management and Oversight.”

The case of Pedro Moncayo shows the need for partnership between the national anticorruption body and the municipal and local levels to design and implement accountability and anticorruption mechanisms at the local level. At the local level, as at the national level, attention should be paid to such issues as sufficient resources, qualified staff, supportive legal framework, an independent judiciary, and a competent local administration.

The city of Windhoek in Namibia established the Office of the Chief Internal Auditor to undertake audit functions of the city’s nine major departments, reporting directly to the chief executive officer of the city. Since the city’s visioning process in 2000, the office has been helping the departments of the city to improve their procedures and practices to enhance accountability and transparency and thus strength trust in the local government. 

Public Procurement

Critics of political and financial devolution from the central government argue that often the systems of public procurement at the sub-national and local levels are rampant with misuse of authority and corruption. Where local governments have established mechanisms and procedures for accountability and transparency in public procurement, citizen trust in and support for local decision making is enhanced. In view of this, countries such as India and the Republic of Korea not only have devolved power and resources to municipalities and local governments but also have initiated mechanisms to hold local officials accountable for their actions, improve efficiency, and reduce corruption in the procurement system.

The government of Andhra Pradesh in India, for example, established an electronic system to offer tenders online and to handle the procedures electronically, so as to provide bidders with an equal opportunity to access tenders in a timely manner. The system reduces the human interface and subjectivity in the bidding and evaluation processes; eliminates cartels and the physical threat they pose, since bidders can submit their bids from anywhere without being physically vulnerable to mafia groups; and minimizes or eliminates tampering with bids, because the information is available to all who have access to the system and does not include physical transfer by humans.

The system is implemented through a public private partnership model in which technology investment and operation are undertaken by the private sector in return for fees collected from the government departments involved. After two and a half years, the system is being used in processing the procurement of eight government departments, thirteen public sector units, fifty-one municipalities, and five universities. The average number of participating suppliers increased from three per tender to four and a half. Quotations decreased by 16 percent in the first year of using the system (2003-04), compared to the previous year, when the system was manual. Procurement cost to the departments dropped by 20 percent as a result of the competition. The website helped tender advertising costs shrink by 25 percent in a year.

The government of Seoul City adopted the Integrity Pact, in which the city government and companies submitting bids vow neither to offer nor to accept briber. All bidders for the city’s construction projects, technical services, and procurement are required to sign the pact. During the bidding stage, the pact is explained to bidders, and only those who take a bidder’s oath to sign the pact are qualified to register their submissions. A government official also signs a principal’s oath. During the contract’s concluding execution stage, both parties must sign a “special condition for contract.” Provisions are made to protect and reward those reporting inside corruption. Specific guidelines have been issued for the bidder’s submissions, employees of bidders, a company code of conduct, and the principal’s oath.

Violators of the pact may face termination of contracts and are banned from bidding for other contracts for six months to two years. The pact is being implemented in two stages: the first stage is for projects at the head office and project offices, and the second stage is for projects in the twenty-five autonomous district offices in Seoul. The ombudsmen are a team of five persons appointed by the mayor of Seoul, one of them being the chief. The ombudsmen. monitor implementation. Ombudsmen are not allowed to hold a concurrent job at the National Assembly, a political party, or any company participating in the bids for public projects.

The Public Record of Operations and Finance (PROOF) was launched in Bangalore, India, in 2002 to monitor the financial performance of the City Corporation in Bangalore. The purpose of PROOF is build trust between local government and-citizens by improving the responsiveness and accountability of the City Corporation. The City Corporation has been providing quarterly financial performance statements in a user-friendly format to the general public.

In Serbia a program titled “Towards More Transparent Budgeting and Public Procurement in Municipalities” consists of the following components: a public opinion poll in selected municipalities, workshops for public officials to introduce new software and standards of public procurements, polls about the quality of services in selected municipalities, and the creation of new project proposals. As a result, the municipalities now have new tools and technologies and training. 

Participatory Budgeting and Auditing

Two effective and interrelated mechanisms for ensuring accountability of local governments and combating corruption at this level are participatory budgeting and auditing. It is widely recognized that in most local governments budgets are not adequately discussed among local actors before presentation to local elected councils. In some cases there are too many donor-driven proposals. Time allowed for discussions among local councilors is too limited. Often, local budgets are written in a technical language that many citizens find difficult to understand in terms of their implications.

In some countries, local governments have initiated mechanisms to facilitate the participation of citizens in economic policymaking and, specifically, in engaging them in the process of budgeting and auditing. Porte Alegre in Brazil and Abra in the Philippines are two examples.

Porto Alegre is recognized for its successful experiment with participatory budgeting and decentralized decisionmaking. The city has considerable control over revenues and taxes at the local level. The experiment started in 1989 when the Brazilian Workers Party won the municipal elections. The process of participatory budgeting provided for the active engagement of local neighborhood associations, nongovernmental organizations, labor union officials, and city government officials. The Workers Party organized two community gatherings during which the people selected regional delegates to represent them during debates about the allocation and spending of the municipal investment budget. The delegates advocate areas of need with the technical staff of the municipality.

According to World Bank reports of the Porto Alegre program, remarkable achievements have been realized. Over the period 1989-96, the number of households with access to water services increased by 18 percent, the municipal sewage system was expanded by 39 percent, and the number of children enrolled in public schools doubled. Every year thirty more kilometers of roads were paved in poor neighborhoods. These outcomes increased the trust of the people in their government. Such accountability motivated people to pay their taxes, leading to a 50 percent rise in government revenues. The successful model in Porto Alegre encouraged its emulation in another 140 of Brazil’s 5,500 municipalities. It has also affected participatory budgeting in the state of Rio Grande do Sul, the capital of which is Porto Alegre.

In Abra, the Philippines, the Concerned Citizens of Abra for Good Governance (CCAGG), an NGO, was established in 1986. The CCAGG was established as a result of the participatory development policy of President Corizon Aquino. The CCAGG signed a memorandum of understanding with the National Economic Development Authority and was trained by it to undertake project monitoring. The CCAGG is active in informing the public about the quality of projects, using community meetings and the media. Its members include students, professionals, housewives, priests, and government employees. Despite receiving risks and threats, the organization has maintained its momentum to investigate projects and fight corruption.

The spark for their action and publicity started when the group challenged a government media report claiming the successful completion of twenty-seven projects in the Abra province by the Ministry of Public Works and Highways. The CCAGG gathered information, photographed and documented the incomplete status of the projects, and submitted all of it to the national government. A government investigation was launched, and the CCAGG findings were verified. Mild reprimands for the government officials in charge of the projects set the CCAGG into action again, to hold the corrupt officials accountable through punishment. Their efforts paid off, with eleven engineers being suspended for dishonesty and misconduct.

The CCAGG investigates projects for substandard materials, poor construction techniques, and fraudulent contracting procedures. Given the effectiveness and efficiency of the CCAGG in monitoring and fighting corruption in public works projects, combined with the expertise it has acquired, the National Audit Commission entered into partnership with the CCAGG to undertake participatory audits in the Abra region. The experience of the CCAGG is a good example of participatory public audits, wherein citizens engage in fighting corruption and ensuring high-quality projects. 

Civil Society Organizations

Civil society engagement and an ongoing dialogue among local actors provide other mechanisms to ensure accountability and transparency, which in turn enhances citizens’ trust in political and economic devolution to local governments. Where citizens do not trust local governments and corruption is rampant, central government officials are likely to impose more conditions on local government bodies.

In Bangalore, India, the first report card on public agencies in. 1994 covered municipal services, including water supply, electricity, telecommunications, and transport. Since then the Public Affairs Center, which was set up in Bangalore by a small group of citizens, has published its “Citizens Report Cards” on several other cities, rural services, and health care. The findings of the first report card on Bangalore are striking. Almost all public service providers received low ratings from the people. The agencies were rated and compared in terms of public satisfaction, corruption, and responsiveness. The media publicity that the findings received and the public discussions that followed made people aware of the magnitude of the problem. In response to increasing demands from civil society groups for better performance, public agencies began to respond to people’s demands and took concrete steps to improve their performance.

The second report card on Bangalore, in 1999, showed better ratings for the some government agencies but not a significant overall improvement in the performance of public sector agencies. The third report, in 2003, however, showed major improvements in citizens’ rating of all public agencies. The incidents of corruption in routine transactions between citizens and public officials declined. Building on the above demand-side efforts, the chief minister established the Bangalore Agenda Task Force to serve as a body for public-private partnerships to work through to improve the quality of services. The task force is monitored by civil society groups and the media.

In Tanzania relationships between local governments, civil society organizations, and the private sector are characterized by conflict, competition over resources, and sometimes hostility. To deal with these challenges, Pajoma, a local civil society organization, developed joint action schemes to encourage cooperation in such fields as governance, education, and solid waste management. In 1998 Pajoma established the first District Advisory Committee as the multi stakeholder platform to identify common development objectives. The objectives of the committee are to increase the effectiveness of service delivery, create trust among partners, coordinate development efforts, and promote collaboration and consensus. As a forum for dialogue, it has now been extended to three districts.

In the Philippines, civil society organizations and community groups have taken critical initiatives to bring about successful reform in service provision. The primary health care service delivery in Surigao City was implemented through women’s clubs. A midwife from the city’s health office, along with local area (Barangay) health workers, organized mothers in neighborhoods and trained them in nutrition education and sanitation. This effort facilitated the delivery of primary health care services, including immunization, family planning, and nutrition education.

The Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism is an independent, nonprofit media agency specializing in investigative journalism. It was founded in 1989 by nine journalists who recognized the need for newspapers and broadcast agencies to go beyond day-to-day reporting. The center is founded on the belief that the media play a crucial role in scrutinizing and strengthening democratic institutions and should thus be a catalyst for social debate and consensus for public welfare, trusting that well-researched information communicated to citizens leads to informed public opinions and public decisions. The center aims at providing training for investigative reporting to full-time reporters, free-lance journalists, and academics. In addition to training, it uses information technology to optimize research and investigation as well as to systematize access to data. It has been conducting ten-day training seminars on investigating corruption at both national and regional levels.

Because the reports prepared by the centere are well researched and well documented, they have contributed to a deeper understanding of issues and, thus, have had an impact on outcomes. The reports have resulted in government actions dealing with corruption, public accountability, and environmental protection. The factors that have led to the success of the center are the professional expertise available among its members and its focus on capacity building and training. Its self-sustaining operations and high-quality outputs have attracted the attention of development partners nationally and regionally.

The power of civil society monitoring is shown by the effectiveness of an independent civil ombudsman in the city of Sendai, Japan, in exposing corruption in public agencies in Japan. In the mid-1990s a group of attorneys established the civil ombudsman to examine payments made for official entertainment. Several corruption cases were exposed, including nonexistent public travel.

The Philippines Report Card on Pro-Poor Services, a pilot project, was supported by the World Bank to get feedback of citizens concerning the performance of government services, including basic health, elementary education, housing, potable water, and food distribution. Periodic Report Card Surveys provide pressures and incentives of public agencies to make concrete improvements in public services, which in turn enhance political legitimacy and effective political devolution to local governments.

Equitable and mutually beneficial partnerships among local actors government, civil society, the private sector, and community groups-are instrumental in both exerting pressure from below for devolution of power and resources and implementing existing decentralization policies and programs. In large metropolitan areas such as Bombay, Mexico City, and Karachi, local government structures can be remote from the day-to-day needs of the people. However, representatives of the metropolitan government along with municipal government employees can forge partnerships with the representatives of civil society, the private sector, and community organizations. These partnerships enable the municipal government to elicit the participation of citizens in municipal government initiatives and also to provide a mechanism for other local actors to hold municipal government functionaries accountable to the people. More important, such local-local partnerships tap into the full complement of human energy in the city.

An interesting example of local partnerships in support of local initiatives is the Local Initiative Facility for the Urban Environment (Life) program) supported by the United Nations Development Program in twelve countries. The design of the Life program is two pronged. The first prong is the creation of mechanisms for promoting dialogue among local actors at the community, municipal, and national levels. These mechanisms include national or city consultation to map priorities, a program selection committee to review local initiatives to promote learning, and community groups to suggest local initiatives that have potential for learning and replication at the municipal and or national level. A national program coordinator is appointed to promote interaction among actors. The second prong includes providing grants for those community initiatives that respond to local environmental problems, such as waste management, environmental education, water supply, and sanitation. Other initiatives with priority are those that promote primary health care and income generation.

The Life program operates in three stages: upstream, catalyzing national dialogue, developing strategies, and gathering support; downstream, ensuring effective and collaborative small projects; and again upstream, disseminating and exchanging information nationally and internationally.

The Life program promotes democracy at the grass roots by empowering local actors and by increasing dialogue among them about their local problems and responsibilities. The result in most cases has been an increased level of local and community organization and the ability of local actors to build on their own local initiatives as well as benefit from national resources. The program also provides a mechanism for civil society organizations and community groups to interact with other local and municipal leaders and representatives of national government in the area. Through the networks created through the program, local leaders are more likely to influence the process of resource allocation at the municipal level. In addition the program provides an effective mechanism for the participation of people in the development process. In most government initiated programs the concept of participation tends to be limited to the involvement of beneficiaries. However, the Life program provides a decentralized structure through which decisions concerning local environmental problems can be made locally.

The Life program shows the need for pro-poor local governance, in which civil society, urban government, the business sector, and representatives of the central government at the local level build partnerships to respond to problems that affect the poor. The pillars of effective pro-poor local governance include elected and autonomous local government with an adequate capacity and information base, strong developmentally oriented civil society organizations, a socially responsible business sector, and partnerships that include these various actors. 

Public Ethics and Integrity

Appropriate laws and regulations and their proper enforcement are essential but not sufficient to promote accountability and transparency and anticorruption strategies. Equally important is the need to strengthen ethics and professionalism among local officials. Those without ethical standards and personal integrity usually find loopholes in laws. Some of the mechanisms used to promote ethics and integrity at the local government level are conflict-of-interest laws, disclosure of income and assets, lobbyist registration, whistle-blower protection, codes of conduct, and ethics training. The focus of a code of conduct can be inspirational (including stated values) or disciplinary (containing minimum standards) or both. Usually the code includes elements of human resource development policies.

In New York City, the Conflict of Interest Board-consisting of five members appointed by the mayor-is the legal entity that enforces the conflict of interest laws of New York. To ensure their independence and impartiality, the members are not allowed to hold public or political party office or work as lobbyists before the city. The board examines financial disclosures, informs local officials about the provisions of the conflict-of-interest laws, and provides training and advisory opinions.

The city and county of San Francisco enacted the San Francisco Lobbyist Ordinance requiring lobbyists to register, to report quarterly any compensation they received, and to report their political contributions to local officials; the ordinance also prohibits gifts to local officials with a value of more than $50. The purpose of the law is to public confidence in the elected local government. 

Conclusion

The devolution of powers and resources to local governments is the most critical component of democratic governance. However, devolution without effective mechanisms and instruments to promote accountability, transparency, and anticorruption at the local level undermines the political legitimacy and effectiveness of local governments. The case studies of good practices in this chapter suggest that devolution with accountability can be promoted through local leadership committed to accountability, anticorruption commissions, transparent procedures for public procurement, participatory budgeting and auditing, the engagement of civil society, and the promotion of ethics and integrity among local officials. These mechanisms and instruments of accountability and transparency in turn promote and sustain political and financial devolution.  

(This paper was read on the occasion of two-day International Conference on MDGs, held on April 29-30 at Islamabad.