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How America Is Funding Corruption in Pakistan
By Azeem Ibrahim

 

”When [Musharraf] looks me in the eye and says, ... ’there won’t be a Taliban and won’t be al Qaeda,’ I believe him, you know?” So said George W. Bush of then Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf in September 2006. The U.S. president’s trust had been forged in a deal made five years earlier: Pakistan would train, equip, and deploy its Army and intelligence service in counterterrorism operations, and Washington promised to reimburse its partner with billions of dollars in weapons, supplies, and cold hard cash. The plan was simple enough, and since 2001, the United States has lived up to its pledge, pouring as much as $12 billion in overt aid and another $10 billion in covert aid to Pakistan.

But today, as the Obama administration re-examines the deal, there is devastating evidence that the billions spent in Pakistan have yielded little in return. For the last eight years, U.S. taxpayers’ money has funded hardly any bona fide counterterrorism successes, but quite a bit of corruption in the Pakistani Army and intelligence services. The money has enriched individuals at the expense of the proper functioning of the country’s institutions. It has provided habitual kleptocrats with further incentives to skim off the top. Despite the U.S. goal of encouraging democratization, assistance to Pakistan has actually weakened the country’s civilian government. And perhaps worst of all, it has hindered Pakistan’s ability to fight terrorists.

How could so much money do so much harm? The first answer is simply that the Pakistani civilian government, with whom Bush signed his agreement, barely controls the Army and intelligence services -- the very institutions meant to receive the bulk of U.S. funds. Until last year, the closest the Army came to accounting for its work was its annual budget submission: a single, bottom-line dollar figure that the government was constitutionally bound to approve. Even now, after a much-hailed move toward more oversight, the Army’s most recent annual budget submission was just two pages. And Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) -- a powerful and independent military agency -- is no better. Last year the Interior Ministry requested that it report to the government; the ISI declined the invitation.

Long before the Bush-Musharraf agreement, money from such unsupervised budgets had enabled the Army to become one of the richest and largest industrial, banking, and landowning bodies in Pakistan. The military formed its own networks of political patronage, co-opting existing political parties with threats and bribes. With the injection of the U.S. cash, this already prevalent military corruption was thrust into high gear. The extra money further discouraged the military and intelligence services from submitting to civilian control -- a precondition for the country’s democratization.

From the U.S. taxpayers’ point of view, that’s the least of the bad news.

Pakistan did not use the majority of the funds for the agreed objective of fighting terrorism. Instead, the money was used in the way it has been for the last six decades: to train and stock the Army for conventional warfare, with India viewed as the main threat. The Army spent the vast majority of U.S. funds on types of military equipment that are practically useless against terrorists. It bought an air defense radar system costing $200 million, for example, even though the terrorists in the frontier region have no air capability. The military bought F-16 fighter jets, aircraft-mounted armaments, and anti-ship defense systems. And the U.S. Department of Defense signed off on it.

Another chunk of the money fed corruption, as is clear from the fact that money was not often spent on the purposes for which it was intended. Of the $920 million in military support that the United States gave Pakistan in 2008 alone, only $300 million reached the Army. The Washington-based Atlantic Council estimates that ”the great majority” ended up in the coffers of the Ministry of Finance.

The rot goes still deeper. U.S. taxpayers paid $1.5 million to repair damage to Navy vehicles that did not see combat (the terrorists don’t have navies, either). Another $15 million went for bunkers that were never dug; $30 million paid for roads that were never built; $55 million went to maintain helicopters that were not, in fact, maintained; and $80 million per month was paid for soldiers to fight during periods when there was a cease-fire.

Meanwhile, U.S. officials visiting the frontier areas, where militants including the Taliban are most entrenched, found that the paramilitary Pakistani Frontier Corps was poorly equipped, even ”standing there in the snow in sandals,” according to one report. Several soldiers were equipped with World War I-era pith helmets and barely functional Kalashnikov rifles with ”just 10 rounds of ammunition apiece.” In an interview with the New York Times in November 2007, Musharraf complained that Pakistan’s helicopters needed more U.S. spare parts and support, despite the United States’ having given his country $8 million worth of helicopter parts over the previous six months.

There’s plenty of blame to go around for such dreadful mismanagement. Part of it, of course, goes to Pakistan. But another chunk falls squarely on U.S. shoulders. From the start, there were few concrete goals for how the funds should be spent. Officials who saw the objectives admitted that they often lacked concrete bench marks, sometimes even concrete figures, and were too vague to be effective.

And until 2006, the U.S. Embassy staff in Pakistan was not required to follow up on how the Pakistani military actually spent U.S. funds. The problem was compounded when the Pakistani Army insisted that the Federally Administered Tribal Areas -- where much of the money was to be spent -- were too dangerous to visit, making sustained oversight there impossible. Finally, the U.S. Department of Defense refused to release detailed figures on Pakistan military aid until 2009, making public scrutiny impossible.

Whomever you impugn, the bottom line is that the U.S.-Pakistan compact of the last eight years has been a disaster. It is essential to ensure that the same mistakes do not happen again. U.S. taxpayers have funded Pakistani corruption and undermined the fight against terrorism and militancy. And for the sake of both countries, it simply has to stop. 

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Pull Pakistan from the Abyss of Chaos and Confusion
By Ishtiaq Ali Mehkri

 

Pakistan, for many, seems to be a difficult country to govern. And things go murky as our politicians and men from military  who off and on take turns to rule  feel like having their own way of doing things.

The acrimony gets more severe when they start believing that the memory of the nation is short-lived and they can have a smooth sailing for all times to come. This is exactly what is happening at the moment as all the big political players, notwithstanding an unending number of cahoots, wheelers and dealers, are trying to hoodwink the nation. They believe that they are above the law, and whatever they did, and are doing, in any capacity, is synonymous with ’national interest’.

The nation is in distress  resultantly. Little or no attention is being paid to their plight, which continues to worsen by the day.

At times, it seems what is left of the national discourse, as the only issue to be dealt with, is perhaps the survival of politicians, their musings, and the well being of hundreds of our so-called public representatives. Not to mention the cost of funding the day-to-day profligacy of civil and military officialdom.

Rising unemployment, spiraling inflation and terrorism have unnerved this, otherwise, enterprising nation, pushing it in the abyss of poverty, instability and lackluster.

Much hope was generated with the installation of a democratic government in the wake of February 2008 elections. A government, which enjoys the confidence of the entire parliament, and the army at its beck and call, has since then gone astray. The parliament, rather than taking up issues of national importance, has been rendered a rubber stamp status. No formidable piece of legislation has been undertaken. Decisions, if any, are being taken in isolation, reflecting contempt for the intelligentsia of the masses and democratic dispensation. Ironically, the much promised balance of power is yet to be restored, as President Asif Ali Zardari doesn’t see any urgency in scrapping the dictatorial clauses in the constitution.

Far from the rhetoric lies the real world of around 160 million people. The fantasies in which the former dictator General Pervez Musharraf indulged in, the broken promises of President Zardari and an uncompromising attitude of the former premier Nawaz Sharif are already taking a heavy toll. The need of the hour is to put to rest the high drama of political exigency, being staged for umpteenth time by the leadership.

A plethora of internal and external issues, ranging from economic downslide to an insurgency on the western borders, continue to lie unattended. The country’s foreign policy is one that is directionless to say the least. Relations with Afghanistan, India and Iran are at the lowest ebb. Islamabad has been unfortunately acting as a proxy for major powers, especially the West and the United States, in dealing with its neighbours, and has not been able to cement people-to-people cooperation. The dreams for geopolitical coordination in the form of an assertive Saarc and three-member grouping of Iran, Pakistan and Turkey (ECO) have remained mere paper statutes  owing to prevalent mistrust in the region.

The impugned war on terror has further complicated the bilateral working relationship, shifting cooperation on the socio-economic issues to the backburner. Similarly, relations with the West, the United States and the Southeast Asia have been one of subdued and submissive nature, which have impacted adversely on national interests.

At home, apart from terrorism, a depressing growth syndrome is enough to undermine prospects of nation building. An excessive reliance on corporate culture has not helped. The cosmetic blend of development that was achieved in the past decade has become a victim of global recession. The nation has, perhaps, been left high and dry  thanks to the wisdom of economic managers who were religiously imported as messiah for our ills. The buzzwords of economy today are: load-shedding, sugar and flour shortage. Not to mention the oil and cement cartels who have fleeced the nation with impunity.

Pakistanis deserve a better deal. The officialdom, military and the politicians need to reorient their mindset from being rulers to servants of the nation. Investing in education, infrastructure and community development can help beat the monsters of radicalism, terrorism and poverty. Politics is the art of the possible. The same spirit should live on while pulling the nation from the abyss of chaos and confusion. There is no room for failing, as its geopolitical ramifications would be simply catastrophic.  

(Ishtiaq Ali Mehkri is Khaleej Times’Assistant Editor (Opinion). Views expressed here are his own.)

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Text of

The Kerry-Lugar Bill, details and conditions

WASHINGTON: The following is the text of the Kerry-Lugar Bill passed by the Senate on Thursday, Sept 24, 2009. It will now go to the House of Representatives and if passed without amendments, will be sent to President Barack Obama for signing into law:

S.1707

Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009 (Engrossed as Agreed to or Passed by Senate)

 

SEC. 203. LIMITATIONS ON CERTAIN ASSISTANCE.

(a) Limitation on Security-related Assistance: For fiscal years 2011 through 2014, no security-related assistance may be provided to Pakistan in a fiscal year until the Secretary of State, under the direction of the President, makes the certification required under subsection (c) for such fiscal year.

 

(b) Limitation on Arms Transfers: For fiscal years 2012 through 2014, no letter of offer to sell major defence equipment to Pakistan may be issued pursuant to the Arms Export Control Act (22 USC 2751 et seq.) and no license to export major defence equipment to Pakistan may be issued pursuant to such Act in a fiscal year until the Secretary of State, under the direction of the President, makes the certification required under subsection (c) for such fiscal year.

 

(c) Certification: The certification required by this subsection is a certification by the Secretary of State, under the direction of the President, to the appropriate congressional committees that: (1) the Government of Pakistan is continuing to cooperate with the United States in efforts to dismantle supplier networks relating to the acquisition of nuclear weapons-related materials, such as providing relevant information from or direct access to Pakistani nationals associated with such networks;

(2) the Government of Pakistan during the preceding fiscal year has demonstrated a sustained commitment to and is making significant efforts towards combating terrorist groups, consistent with the purposes of assistance described in section 201, including taking into account the extent to which the Government of Pakistan has made progress on matters such as (A) ceasing support, including by any elements within the Pakistan military or its intelligence agency, to extremist and terrorist groups, particularly to any group that has conducted attacks against the United States or coalition forces in Afghanistan, or against the territory or people of neighbouring countries; (B) preventing al-Qaeda, the Taliban and associated terrorist groups, such as Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed, from operating in the territory of Pakistan, including carrying out cross-border attacks into neighbouring countries, closing terrorist camps in the Fata, dismantling terrorist bases of operations in other parts of the country, including Quetta and Muridke, and taking action when provided with intelligence about high-level terrorist targets; and (C) strengthening counterterrorism and anti-money laundering laws; and (3) the security forces of Pakistan are not materially and substantially subverting the political or judicial processes of Pakistan.

 

(d) Certain Payments:

(1) IN GENERAL - Subject to paragraph

(2) none of the funds appropriated for security-related assistance for fiscal years 2010 through 2014, or any amounts appropriated to the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund established under the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2009 (Public Law 111-32), may be obligated or expended to make payments relating to

(A) the Letter of Offer and Acceptance PK-D-YAD signed between the Governments of the United States of America and Pakistan on September 30, 2006;

(B) the Letter of Offer and Acceptance PK-D-NAP signed between the Governments of the United States of America and Pakistan on September 30, 2006; and C) the Letter of Offer and Acceptance PK-D-SAF signed between the Governments of the United States of America and Pakistan on September 30, 2006.

(2) EXCEPTION: Funds appropriated for security-related assistance for fiscal years 2010 through 2014 may be used for construction and related activities carried out pursuant to the Letters of Offer and Acceptance described in paragraph (1).

 

(e) Waiver: (1) IN GENERAL - The Secretary of State, under the direction of the President, may waive the limitations contained in subsections (a), (b), and (d) for a fiscal year if the Secretary of State determines that is important to the national security interests of the United States to do so.

(2) PRIOR NOTICE OF WAIVER: The Secretary of State, under the direction of the President, may not exercise the authority of paragraph (1) until seven days after the Secretary of State provides to the appropriate congressional committees a written notice of the intent to issue to waiver and the reasons therefore. The notice may be submitted in classified or unclassified form, as necessary.

 

(f) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined: In this section, the term ‘appropriate congressional committees’ means (1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives; and (2) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.

 

SEC. 204. PAKISTAN COUNTERINSURGENCY CAPABILITY FUND.

(a) For Fiscal Year 2010: (1) IN GENERAL - For fiscal year 2010, the Department of State’s Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund established under the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2009 (Public Law 111-32), hereinafter in this section referred to as the ‘Fund’, shall consist of the following: (A) Amounts appropriated to carry out this subsection (which may not include any amounts appropriated to carry out title I of this Act).

(B) Amounts otherwise available to the Secretary of State to carry out this subsection.

(2) PURPOSES OF FUND: Amounts in the Fund made available to carry out this subsection for any fiscal year are authorised to be used by the Secretary of State, with the concurrence of the Secretary of Defence, to build and maintain the counterinsurgency capability of Pakistan under the same terms and conditions (except as otherwise provided in this subsection) that are applicable to amounts made available under the Fund for fiscal year 2009.

(3) TRANSFER AUTHORITY: (A) IN GENERAL - The Secretary of State is authorised to transfer amounts in the fund made available to carry out this subsection for any fiscal year to the Department of Defence’s Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund established under the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2009 (Public Law 111-32) and such amounts may be transferred back to the Fund if the Secretary of Defence, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, determines that such amounts are not needed for the purposes for which initially transferred.

(B) TREATMENT OF TRANSFERRED FUNDS: Subject to subsections (d) and (e) of section 203, transfers from the Fund under the authority of subparagraph (A) shall be merged with and be available for the same purposes and for the same time period as amounts in the Department of Defence’s Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund.

(C) RELATION TO OTHER AUTHORITIES: The authority to provide assistance under this subsection is in addition to any other authority to provide assistance to foreign countries.

(D) NOTIFICATION: The Secretary of State shall, not less than 15 days prior to making transfers from the Fund under subparagraph (A), notify the appropriate congressional committees in writing of the details of any such transfer.

 

(b) Submission of Notifications: Any notification required by this section may be submitted in classified or unclassified form, as necessary.

 

(c) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined: In this section, the term ‘appropriate congressional committees’ means (1) the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives; and (2) the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate.

 

SEC. 205. REQUIREMENTS FOR CIVILIAN CONTROL OF CERTAIN ASSISTANCE

(a) Requirements: (1) IN GENERAL - For fiscal years 2010 through 2014, any direct cash security-related assistance or non-assistance payments by the United States to the Government of Pakistan may only be provided or made to civilian authorities of a civilian government of Pakistan.

(2) DOCUMENTATION: For fiscal years 2010 through 2014, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defence, shall ensure that civilian authorities of a civilian government of Pakistan have received a copy of final documentation provided to the United States related to non-assistance payments provided or made to the Government of Pakistan.

 

(b) Waiver: 1) SECURITY-RELATED ASSISTANCE: The Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Defence, may waive the requirements of subsection (a) with respect to security-related assistance described in subsection (a) funded from accounts within budget function 150 (International Affairs) if the Secretary of State certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that the waiver is important to the national security interest of the United States.

(2) NON-ASSISTANCE PAYMENTS: The Secretary of Defence, in consultation with the Secretary of State, may waive the requirements of subsection (a) with respect to non-assistance payments described in subsection (a) funded from accounts within budget function 050 (National Defence) if the Secretary of Defense certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that the waiver is important to the national security interest of the United States.

 

(c) Application to Certain Activities- Nothing in this section shall apply with respect to (1) any activities subject to reporting requirements under title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413 et seq.); (2) any assistance to promote democratic elections or public participation in democratic processes; (3) any assistance or payments if the Secretary of State determines and certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that subsequent to the termination of assistance or payments a democratically elected government has taken office; (4) any assistance or payments made pursuant to section 1208 of the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 (Public Law 108-375; 118 Stat. 2086), as amended; (5) any payments made pursuant to the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement between the Department of Defense of the United States of America and the Ministry of Defense of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan; and (6) any assistance or payments made pursuant to section 943 of the Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009 (Public Law 110-417; 122 Stat. 4578).

 

(d) Definitions- In this section (1) the term ‘appropriate congressional committees’ means the Committees on Appropriations, Armed Services, and Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and the Committees on Appropriations, Armed Services, and Foreign Relations of the Senate; and (2) the term ’civilian government of Pakistan’ does not include any government of Pakistan whose duly elected head of government is deposed by military coup or decree.

 

TITLE IIISTRATEGY, ACCOUNTABILITY, MONITORING, AND OTHER PROVISIONS SEC. 301. STRATEGY REPORTS

(a) Pakistan Assistance Strategy Report- Not later than 45 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report describing United States policy and strategy with respect to assistance to Pakistan under this Act. The report shall include the following: (1) A description of the principal objectives of United States assistance to Pakistan to be provided under title I of this Act.

(2) A general description of the specific programs, projects, and activities designed to achieve the purposes of section 101 and the respective funding levels for such programs, projects, and activities for fiscal years 2010 through 2014.

(3) A plan for program monitoring, operations research, and impact evaluation research for assistance authorized under title I of this Act.

(4) A description of the role to be played by Pakistani national, regional, and local officials and members of Pakistani civil society and local private sector, civic, religious, and tribal leaders in helping to identify and implement programs and projects for which assistance is to be provided under this Act, and of consultations with such representatives in developing the strategy.

(5) A description of the steps taken, or to be taken, to ensure assistance provided under this Act is not awarded to individuals or entities affiliated with terrorist organizations.

(6) A projection of the levels of assistance to be provided to Pakistan under this Act, broken down into the following categories as described in the annual ‘Report on the Criteria and Methodology for Determining the Eligibility of Candidate Countries for Millennium Challenge Account Assistance’: (A) Civil liberties. (B) Political rights. (C) Voice and accountability. (D) Government effectiveness. (E) Rule of law. (F) Control of corruption. (G) Immunization rates. (H) Public expenditure on health. (I) Girls’ primary education completion rate. (J) Public expenditure on primary education. (K) Natural resource management. (L) Business start-up. (M) Land rights and access. (N) Trade policy. (O) Regulatory quality. (P) Inflation control. (Q) Fiscal policy.

(7) An analysis for the suitable replacement for existing Pakistani helicopters, including recommendations for sustainment and training.

 

(b) Comprehensive Regional Strategy Report: (1) SENSE OF CONGRESS: It is the sense of Congress that the achievement of United States national security goals to eliminate terrorist threats and close safe havens in Pakistan requires the development of a comprehensive plan that utilizes all elements of national power, including in coordination and cooperation with other concerned governments, and that it is critical to Pakistan’s long-term prosperity and security to strengthen regional relationships among India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan.

(2) COMPREHENSIVE REGIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY: The President shall develop a comprehensive interagency regional security strategy to eliminate terrorist threats and close safe havens in Pakistan, including by working with the Government of Pakistan and other relevant governments and organizations in the region and elsewhere, as appropriate, to best implement effective counterinsurgency and counterterrorism efforts in and near the border areas of Pakistan and Afghanistan, including the FATA, the NWFP, parts of Balochistan, and parts of Punjab.

(3) REPORT: (A) IN GENERAL- Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on the comprehensive regional security strategy required under paragraph (2).

(B) CONTENTS- The report shall include a copy of the comprehensive regional security strategy, including specifications of goals, and proposed timelines and budgets for implementation of the strategy.

(C) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DEFINED: In this paragraph, the term ‘appropriate congressional committees’ means (i) the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives; and (ii) the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Relations, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.

 

(c) Security-related Assistance Plan- Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a plan for the proposed use of amounts authorized for security-related assistance for each of the fiscal years 2010 through 2014. Such plan shall include an assessment of how the use of such amounts complements or otherwise is related to amounts described in section 204.

 

SEC. 302. MONITORING REPORTS

(a) Semi-Annual Monitoring Report- Not later than 180 days after the submission of the Pakistan Assistance Strategy Report pursuant to section 301(a), and every 180 days thereafter through September 30, 2014, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that describes the assistance provided under this Act during the preceding 180-day period. The report shall include

(1) a description of all assistance by program, project, and activity, as well as by geographic area, provided pursuant to title I of this Act during the period covered by the report, including the amount of assistance provided for each program or project, and with respect to the first report a description of all amounts made available for assistance to Pakistan during fiscal year 2009, including a description of each program, project, and activity for which funds were made available; (2) a list of persons or entities from the United States or other countries that have received funds in excess of $100,000 to conduct projects under title I of this Act during the period covered by the report, which may be included in a classified annex, if necessary to avoid a security risk, and a justification for the classification; (3) with respect to the plan described in section 301(a)(3), updates to such plan and a description of best practices to improve the impact of the assistance authorized under title I of this Act; (4) an assessment of the effectiveness of assistance provided under title I of this Act during the period covered by the report in achieving desired objectives and outcomes as guided by the plan described in section 301(a)(3), and as updated pursuant to paragraph (3) of this subsection, including a systematic, qualitative, and where possible, quantitative basis for assessing whether desired outcomes are achieved and a timeline for completion of each project and program; (5) a description of any shortfall in United States financial, physical, technical, or human resources that hinder the effective use and monitoring of such funds; (6) a description of any negative impact, including the absorptive capacity of the region for which the resources are intended, of United States bilateral or multilateral assistance and recommendations for modification of funding, if any; (7) any incidents or reports of waste, fraud, and abuse of expenditures under title I of this Act; (8) the amount of funds authorized to be appropriated pursuant to section 102 that were used during the reporting period for administrative expenses or for audits and program reviews pursuant to the authority under sections 101(c)(2) and 103; (9) a description of the expenditures made from any Chief of Mission Fund established pursuant to section 101(c)(5) during the period covered by the report, the purposes for which such expenditures were made, and a list of the recipients of any expenditures from the Chief of Mission Fund in excess of $100,000; (10) an accounting of assistance provided to Pakistan under title I of this Act, broken down into the categories set forth in section 301(a)(6); (11) an evaluation of efforts undertaken by the Government of Pakistan to (A) disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda, the Taliban, and other extremist and terrorist groups in the FATA and settled areas; (B) eliminate the safe havens of such forces in Pakistan; (C) close terrorist camps, including those of Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed; (D) cease all support for extremist and terrorist groups; (E) prevent attacks into neighbouring countries; (F) increase oversight over curriculum in Madrassas, including closing Madrassas with direct links to the Taliban or other extremist and terrorist groups; and (G) improve counterterrorism financing and anti-money laundering laws, apply for observer status for the Financial Action Task Force, and take steps to adhere to the United Nations International Convention for the Suppression of Financing of Terrorism; (12) a detailed description of Pakistan’s efforts to prevent proliferation of nuclear-related material and expertise; (13) an assessment of whether assistance provided to Pakistan has directly or indirectly aided the expansion of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program, whether by the diversion of United States assistance or the reallocation of Pakistan’s financial resources that would otherwise be spent for programs and activities unrelated to its nuclear weapons program; (14) a detailed description of the extent to which funds obligated and expended pursuant to section 202(b) meet the requirements of such section; and (15) an assessment of the extent to which the Government of Pakistan exercises effective civilian control of the military, including a description of the extent to which civilian executive leaders and parliament exercise oversight and approval of military budgets, the chain of command, the process of promotion for senior military leaders, civilian involvement in strategic guidance and planning, and military involvement in civil administration.

 

(b) Government Accountability Office Reports:

(1) PAKISTAN ASSISTANCE STRATEGY REPORT: Not later than one year after the submission of the Pakistan Assistance Strategy Report pursuant to section 301(a), the Comptroller General of the United States shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that contains (A) a review of, and comments addressing, the Pakistan Assistance Strategy Report; (B) recommendations relating to any additional actions the Comptroller General believes could help improve the efficiency and effectiveness of United States efforts to meet the objectives of this Act; (C) a detailed description of the expenditures made by Pakistan pursuant to grant assistance under section 23 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 USC). 

 

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